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378 ESTATE OF CALHOUN [44 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 22987. In Bank. Apr. 26, 1955.] 
Estate of GEORGE A. CALHOUN, Deceased. DAISY OREB, 
as Administratrix, etc., Appellant, v. WALTER WIL-
LIAM PETTIT, Respondent. 
[1] Decedents' Estates-Appointment of Administrator-Persons 
Entitled.-Requirement of Prob. Code, § 422, that relative may 
claim priority to letters of administration only when he is 
entitled to succeed to decedent's estate or some portion of it is 
in addition to his other qualifications. 
[2] Descent-Source of Right: Adoption-Origin of Right.-Rights 
of inheritance, as well as subject of adoption and rights and 
obligations resulting from it, are entirely matters of statutory 
regulation. 
[3] Adoption-Inheritance.-Prob. Code, § 257, when enacted in 
1931, did not change existing law relating to right of inherit-
ance by and from adopted children, but is restatement of it. 
[4] Id.-Inheritance.-It must be presumed that construction 
placed on provisions of former Civ. Code, § 1386, by previous 
court decisions, to effect that adoption effects change in status 
for purpose of inheritance only between child and his natural 
parents and between him and his adoptive parents, was carried 
into new sections of Prob. Code, and that § 257 of such code 
is restatement of that construction. 
[5] Id.-InheritaDce.-While adopted child inherits from his 
adopting parents, he does not inherit through them from rela-
tives of adoptive parents. 
[6] Descent-Persons Who Take-Brothers and Sisters.-Inherit. 
ance between adopted child and his foster brothers and sisters 
is excluded from words "brother or sister" within meaning of 
Prob. Code, § 225, directing line of succession to estate of 
intestate. 
[7] Adoption-Power of Legislature.-Supreme Court may not 
usurp legislative function to change statutory law with respect 
to adoption of children, however desirable it might be to effect 
complete substitution in family relationship. 
[8] Descent-Source of Title as Affecting Succession.-Statute of 
succession, in providing for disposition of separate property 
of one dying intestate, makes no distinctions based on channel 
through which property may have come to decedent. 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 128 et seq. 
[3] See Oal.Jur.2d, Adoption of Children, § 48 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates, § 72; [2] Descent, 
§ 5; Adoption, § 2; [3, 4] Adoption, § 38; [5] Adoption, § 39; [6] 
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APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County revoking letters of administration to one 
party and granting letters of administration to another party. 
Stanley Mosk, Judge. Affirmed. 
Charles C. Morrison for Appellant. 
Richard McLeod for Respondent. 
Louis Thomsen as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent. 
EDMONDS, J.-Letters of administration in the estate of 
George A. Calhoun were issued to Daisy Oreb, the natural 
daughter of Calhoun's adoptive parents. Her appeal from 
an order revoking those letters and appointing Walter Wil-
liam Pettit, a natural brother of the decedent, as adminis-
trator, presents for determination the conflicting claims of 
Mrs. Oreb and the blood relatives of Calhoun to the right 
to succeed to his estate. 
These facts are stipulated: 
George was the youngest of four children born to William 
and Anna Fortna. Each of the children, when less than 4 
years old, was adopted into a different family. Elder sisters, 
Leona and Ruth, were taken into families whose identities are 
not shown by the record. His brother, James William, in 
1913 at the age of 2 years was adopted by the Pettit family 
and given the name of Walter William. In 1917, when 4 
years old, George was adopted by Ezra and Victoria Calhoun, 
who had an older daughter, Daisy. 
The decedent's estate consists entirely 0:1: his share of the 
estate of Victoria Calhoun, his adoptive mother, who pre-
deceased him by about two years. Surviving him were Daisy 
Oreb, Walter Pettit, his natural sister Ruth Rice, and the 
issue of his deceased sister, Leona. Both his natural parents 
and adoptive parents predeceased him. There are no other 
surviving relatives. 
Mrs. Oreb petitioned for letters of administration upon 
the ground that she is the decedent's sister. Section 
422 of the Probate Code, l which specifies the persons entitled 
:U t Administration of the estate of a person dying intestate must be 
granted to one or more of the following persons, who are entitled t6 
letters i». the following order, the relatives of the decedent beinK eD-
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to have letters issued, includes "brothers and sisters." (Subd. 
(5).) Although that subdivision has not been construed in 
connection with the question as to whether foster brothers and 
sisters are included within it, the terms used to designate 
other relationships have been deemed sufficiently broad to 
include those resulting from adoption. (Cf. Estate of Camp, 
131 Cal. 469, 470 [63 P. 736, 82 Am.St.Rep. 371] [child]; 
Estate of Mercer, 205 Cal. 506, 507 [271 P. 1067] [issue of 
predeceased spouse] ; Estate of Grazzini, 31 Cal.App.2d 168, 
172-173 [87 P.2d 713] [children]; Estate of Summers, 51 Cal. 
App.2d 39, 40 [124 P.2d 941 [grandchild].) For the purposes 
of the present case, it may be assumed that a foster sister, if 
otherwise qualified, may claim the right to letters of admin-
istration. 
[1] According to section 422, a relative may claim priority 
to letters of administration only when he is entitled to suc-
ceed to the decedent's estate or to some portion of it. This 
requirement is in addition to his other qualifications. (Estate 
of Sayers, 203 Cal. 753, 756 [265 P. 924] ; cf. Estate of Her-
riott, 219 Cal. 529, 531 [28 P.2d 355].) As the parties agree, 
the controlling issue is whether Calhoun's natural brother or 
his foster sister is entitled to succeed to his estate. 
[2] Rights of inheritance, as well as the subject of adop-
tion and the rights and obligations resulting from it, are 
entirely matters of statutory regulation. (Estate of Jobson, 
164 Cal. 312, 315 [128 P. 938, 43 L.R.A.N.S. 1062]; In re 
Darling, 173 Cal. 221, 223 [159 P. 606].) Necessarily, the 
claim of each of the parties to the right to share in Calhoun's 
estate depends upon the effect to be given to section 225 of 
the Probate Code, which provides: "If the decedent leaves 
neither issue nor spouse, the estate goes to his parents in 
equal shares, ..• or if both are dead in equal shares to his 
titled to priority only when they are entitled to succeed to the estate 
or some portion thereof: 
II (1) The surviving spouse, or some competent perllOD. whom he 01' 
she may request to have appointed. 
"(2) The children. 
"(3) The grandchildren. 
" (4) The parents. 
II (5) The brothers and sisters. 
"(6) The next of kin entitled to share In the estate. 
"(7) The relatives of a previously deceased spouse, when Stlch rela· 
tives are entitled to succeed to some portion of the eatatQ. 
"(8) The public administrator • 
.. (9) The creditors. 
"(10) .AJq persoa leKalq competent-" 
) 
) 
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brothers and sisters and to the descendants of deceased 
brothers and sisters by right of representation." 
Mrs. Oreb's position is that the words "brothers and sis-
ters" must be read as referring to the relationships resulting 
from the decedent's adoption, and as excluding his natural 
brothers and sisters. She contends that adoption effects a 
complete change in the child's status, terminating the right 
of his natural relatives to inherit from him and substituting 
as heirs his adoptive relatives. A somewhat different theory 
is that she is entitled to succeed to Calhoun's estate as the 
issue of her deceased parents. Pettit argues that an adoption 
affects the right of inheritance only between the child and his 
natural parents and between him and his adoptive parents. 
The earliest California statute regulating adoption made 
specific provision as to its effect upon inheritance. It de-
clared in part: "A minor, when adopted, shall be entitled to 
the name of the party adopting, and the two thenceforth shall 
bear towards each other the legal relation of parent and child, 
and the minor shall enjoy all the legal rights and subject 
to all the duties appertaining to that relation; except, how-
ever, that if the adopted child leaves descendants, ascendants, 
brothers or sisters, the party adopting, nor his relatives, shall 
not inherit the estate of the adopted child .... " (Stats. 
1869-1870, p. 530, 531.) When the Civil Code was enacted, a 
similar provision was included in it. However, that statute 
omitted the clause in regard to inheritance. It read: "A 
child, when adopted, takes the name of the person adopting, 
and the two thenceforth sustain towards each other the legal 
relation of parent and child, and have all the right and are 
subject to all the duties of that relation." ( § 228.) Minor 
changes in wording were made the following year, and as so 
revised the section has remained unchanged until the present 
time. (Amendments to the Codes, 1873-1874, p. 195.) 
Other sections of the Civil Code enacted at the same time 
included 227, which provided that upon adoption the judge 
should "make an order declaring that the child shall thence-
forth be regarded and treated in all respects as the child of 
the person adopting" and section 229 which declares: "The 
parents of an adopted child are, from the time of adoption, 
relieved of all parental duties towards, and all responsibility 
for, the child so adopted, and have no right over it." 
I'll, re Newman, 75 Cal. 213 [16 P. 887, 7 Am.St.Rep. 146], 
collBtrued these sectiollB in connection with subdivision 1 of 
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former section 1386 of the Civil Code2 with regard to the 
right of an adopted child to succeed by inheritance to the 
estate of the adopting parent. The court concluded that it 
was necessary to read "child" and "children" in section 
1386 of the Civil Code as including adopted children in order 
to give effect to the requirements that an adopted child, by 
virtue of that status, is to be "regarded and treated in all 
respects as the child of the person adopting" and is to "have 
all the rights and be subject to all the duties of the legal 
relation of parent and child." (Accord: In re Williams, 102 
Cal. 70, 82 [36 P. 407, 41 Am.St.Rep. 163] ; ct. In re Johnson, 
98 Cal. 531 [33 P. 460, 21 L.R.A. 380] ; In re Evans, 106 Cal. 
562, 564-566 [39 P. 860].) 
In Estate of Jobson, 164 Cal. 312 [128 P. 938, 43 L.R.A.N.S. 
1062], the right of the natural parent of an adopted child 
to succeed to his estate was considered. The court noted that 
section 229 of the Civil Code relieved the parents of an 
adopted child "of all parental duties towards, and all re-
sponsibility for, the child" and of all right over it. It was 
held that the statutes relating to adoption implied that "the 
natural relationship between the child and its parents by blood 
is superseded." (P. 317.) The question of the right of in-
heritance of collateral relatives of the child and adopting 
parents was expressly left open. 
However, when In re Darlmg, 173 Cal. 221 [159 P. 606], 
concerning the right of an adopted child to succeed to the 
estate of his natural grandparent, came before the court, it 
said: "The adoption statutes of this state do not purport 
to affect the relationship of any person other than that of 
the parents by blood, the adopting parents, and the child. It 
is the person adopting and the child who, by the express terms 
of the section, after adoption 'shall sustain towards each other 
the legal relation of parent and child and have all the rights 
and be subject to all the duties of that relation,' and it is 
'''When any person having title to any estate dies without disposing 
of the estate by will, it is succeeded to and must be distributed ... in 
the following manner: 
"1. If the decedent leave no surviving husband or wife, but leave 
issue, the whole estate goes to such issue; and if such issue consists of 
more than one child living, or one child living and the lawful issue of one 
or more deceased children, then the estate goes in equal shares to the 
children living, or to the child living, and the issue of the deceased 
child or children, by the right of representation." 
In 1931, the provisions of former section 1386 of the Civil Code were 
reenacted in the Probate Code as sections 220·229, and 231. (Stata. 
1»31, 00. 281, p. 596·598.) 
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the parents by blood who, from the time of the adoption, are 
'relieved of all parental duties towards, and all responsibilities 
for the child so adopted, and have no right over it,' and are, 
in the eyes of the law, no longer its parents. The adoption 
simply fixes the status of the child as to its former and adopted 
parents. To its grandparents by blood it continues to be a 
grandchild, and the child of its parents by blood. It does not 
acquire new grandparents in the persons of the father and 
mother of an adopting parent. 
"It is only in so far as it is necessary to protect the full 
rights of the child as a child of the adopting parents and the 
corresponding rights of the adopting parents as father and 
mother of the adopted child that the statutes relative to adop-
tion can play any part in the construction of section 1386 of 
the Civil Code, the inheritance statute here involved. As 
was said in Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456 [98 S.W. 585, 
118 Am.St.Rep. 672, 9 Ann.Cas. 775, 8 L.R.A.N.S. 117]: 'In 
fact, it may be laid down as a general conclusion that while 
the statute of adoption must be read into the statute of dower 
and that of descents and distribution, it is with this singu-
larity always to be observed, viz., that the adopted child is 
so let in only for the purpose of preserving in full its right 
of inheritance from its adoptive parent.' 
"This was followed by the statement 'and the door to 
inheritance is shut and its bolt shot at that precise point,' 
a statement which appears to be sustained by the authorities 
generally in the absence of plain statutory provision to the 
contrary." (Pp. 225-226.) 
Cases arising in other states were reviewed extensively and 
were said to be consistent with this conclusion. "So far as 
we have been able to find, there is no decision given under 
statutes anything like ours to the effect that the adopted child 
has any right of inheritance as to the ancestors or collateral 
kindred of the adopting parents, or is deprived by the adoption 
of any right of inheritance that he had as to the ancestor and 
collateral kindred of his parents by blood." (P. 226.) 
In Estate of Pence, 117 Cal.App. 323 [4 P.2U 202], the 
adopted son of decedent's predeceased brother sought to suc-
ceed as next of kin, pursuant to former section 1386 of the 
Civil Code, subdivision 5. (Now Prob. Code, § 226.) Upon 
the reasoning of the Darling case, it was held that "the rights 
of inheritance of an adopted cl1i1d, although complete with 
respect to the a(lopting parent, do not extend to the collatera! 
relatives of that parent." (P. 333.) 
) 
/ 
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In these cases, all of which were decided prior to 1931, the 
statutes relating to the right of succession considered in con-
nection with those relating to adoption, had been construed 
as follows: (1) the adopted child inherits from his adopting 
parents and they inherit from him; (2) upon adoption he 
ceases to inherit from his natural parents, and they cease to 
inherit from him; (3) the adopted child's status with regard 
to other natural relatives is not changed, and his right to 
inherit from them is not cut off by the adoption; and (4) by 
the adoption the child does not gain the right to inherit from 
collateral relatives of the adopting parents. Although no case 
squarely decided that collateral relatives of the adopting 
parents may not inherit from the child, it was stated in the 
Jobson case, supra, " [w] hatever the rule may be with respect 
to the right of succession, it must apply to both parties 
alike. " (164 Cal. 315.) 
In 1929, the Legislature created a code commission to 
revise, codify and restate the probate law. (Stats. 1929, 
p. 1427.) The commissioners' report was accepted, and in 
1a31 the Probate Code was enacted. Sections 227, 228 and 
229 of the Civil Code relating to adoption were not changed 
but a new provision was added which reads: " An 
adopted child succeeds to the estate of one who has adopted 
him, the same as a natural child; and the person adopting 
succeeds to the estate of an adopted child, the same as a natural 
parent. An adopted child does not succeed to the estate of a 
natural parent when the relationship between them has been 
severed by the adoption, nor does such natural parent succeed 
to the estate of such adopted child." (Prob. Code, § 257.) 
[3] This statute did not change the existing law relating 
to the right of inheritance by and from adopted children, but 
is a restatement of it. "The commissioners realized that they 
were not authorized to propose changes in the substance of 
the existing laws, for in the report whi('D. they submitted with 
the draft of the Probate Code they stated: 'By the statute 
creating the Code Commission, its powers are limited to pre-
paring such "restatement as would best serve clearly and 
correctly to express the existing provisions of law," and it 
is not within the province of the Code Commission to embody 
in its report any substantial changes in the existing laws.' 
( Cal. Prob. Code, Commissioners' Report, 1930, p. 10.)" 
(Estate of Hebert, 42 Cal.App.2d 664,667-668 [109 P.2d 729].) 
In the Hebert case, the effect of the enactment of section 
257 of the Probate Code upon an adopted child's riiht to 
) 
) 
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suc~eed by representation was considered. The court said: 
"The same legislature which enacted the code section above 
quoted [section 257 of the Probate Code] also enacted section 
222 of the Probate Code, which was based upon section 1386 
of the Civil Code. Both of these sections provide that the 
issue of a decedent shall inherit by right of representation. 
At the same time the legislature continued in effect the adop-
tion provisions of the Civil Code, sections 227-229. These 
sections had theretofore been construed as granting inherit-
ance rights to the children of a predeceased adopted child of 
the adopting parent. (Citations. ) 
"If a statute has been judicially construed and is later 
reenacted in the same or substantially the same terms it is 
presumed that the legislature was familiar with the construc-
tion which had been placed upon the statute by the courts 
and that such construction, in the absence of an express 
provision requiring a different construction, was adopted by 
the legislature as a part of the law. (Citations.) It is clear 
that if section 257 had been omitted when the Probate Code 
was enacted it would have been the clear duty of the court 
to declare the respondents to be the heirs of decedent. We 
find nothing in section 257 requiring any other determination, 
since it is a 'restatement' designed to 'clearly and correctly 
express the existing provisions of law' as interpreted by the 
courts. " (42 Ca1.App.2d 668.) 
That reasoning is equally applicable to the other pro-
visions of former section 1386 of the Civil Code reenacted in 
the Probate Code. [4] It must be presumed that the con-
struction placed upon them by previous decisions, to the effect 
that adoption effects a change in status for the purpose of 
inheritance only between the child and his natural parents 
and between him and his adoptive parents, was carried into 
the new sections, and that section 257 of the Probate Code is 
a restatement of that construction. 
Since 1931, the cases considering section 257 have uniformly 
so construed it, and have applied it so as toexdllde a right 
of inheritance between an adopted child and kindred of the 
adopting parents. (Estate of Jones, 3 Cal.App.2d 395, 400 
[39 P.2d 847] [holding an adopted daughter of the testatrix' 
husband's predeceased brother was not the husband's" heir' '] ; 
Estate of Stewart, 30 Cal.App.2d 594, 598 [86 P.2d 1071] 
[holding that the adopted children of the testator's cousin 
are not "next of kin "1; Estate of Kruse, 120 Ca1.App.2d 
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of the testatrix' sister is not an "heir"} ; see also Estate of 
Pierce, 32 Ca1.2d 265, 269 [196 P.2d 1] ; comment 25 Cal.L. 
Rev. 81, 85-87.) [5] As stated in the Kruse case, "It has been 
consistently held that an adopted child while he inherits from 
his adopting parents does not inherit through them from the 
relatives of the adoptive parents." (120 Cal.App.2d 256.) 
[6] In no decision has the court determined the status of 
an adopted child as a "brother or sister" within the meaning 
of section 225 of the Probate Code. However, the basis for 
excluding rights of inheritance in cases concerning members 
of the adopting family other than the parents is that adoption 
affects only the rights between the child and his nat"ural 
parents and between him and his adopting parents. From that 
principle it logically follows that inheritance between an 
adopted child and his foster brothers and sisters is excluded. 
Dictum in Estate 0/ Esposito, 57 Cal.App.2d 859 [135 P.2d 
167], supports this conclusion: "It has never been held," 
said the court, "so far as we are advised, that adoption does 
more than substitute foster parents for natural parents, with-
out affecting the relationship of the child toward its relatives 
by blood and without creating new relationships with the 
kindred of the foster parents. So far as the right of inheri-
tance is concerned, the child does not acquire new brothers 
and sisters in the persons of the natural children of the 
adoptive parents (citation) nor lose the brothers and sisters 
of its own blood." (Pp. 865-866.) 
Mrs. Oreb relies upon several decisions as indicating a 
legislative intent to make a more complete substitution in 
the status of the adopted child than is indicated in the cases 
which have been discussed. These decisions, however, do not 
involve the right of intestate succession except insofar as 
that right stems from a statute applicable because of the 
child's status in relationship to the adopting parent. They 
are consistent with the principle of the Darling case, and 
many of them expressly recognize and approve its reasoning. 
(C/. Estate of Mercer, 205 Cal. 506, 508 [271 P. 1067] [adopted 
daughter of predeceased husband as "child" under former 
Civ. Code, § 1386, subd. 8; now Prob. Code, § 228]; Estat, 
of Winchester, 140 Cal. 4G8 [74 P. 10], and Estate of Morril, 
56 Cal.App.2d 715 [133 P.2d 452] [considering an adopted 
child as "issue" for the purposes of inheritance tax exemp-
tions]; Estate of Wardell, 57 Cal. 484 [pretermitted heir 
statutes] ; Estate 0/ Esposito, supra, 57 Cal.App.2d 859 [anti-
lapse atatutoJ; I8e comment, 25 Cal.LoRey. S1, 85-8'1.) 
) 
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Both Mrs. Oreb and Pettit have cited many decisions in 
other jurisdictions. These and other cases are collected in 
annotations in 38 American Law Reports 8, and 120 American 
Law Reports 837, where the determination of the question here 
concerned is said to depend upon the wording of the par-
ticular statute involved. Because of the various and conflict-
ing provisions of the statutes, there is no basis upon which 
the cases in other states may be reconciled. 
When the original adoption statutes were enacted, adop-
tions were infrequent and most often occurred when the 
parents consented to the adoption of their child by persons 
known to them, or as a consequence of the assumption of care 
and custody of an orphan by a blood relative. Under present-
day conditions it may be the better social policy to substitute 
the relationship of the adoptive family for that of the blood 
relatives. With many children placed for adoption by agencies 
licensed for that purpose, there has developed a demand for 
secrecy as to the identity of the blood relatives, and in most 
cases, for all practical purposes, an adopted child is entirely 
cut off from his natural family relationships. 
[7] This court may not usurp the legislative function to 
change the statutory law which has been uniformly construed 
by a long line of judicial decisions. (See Estate of Stewart, 
30 Cal.App.2d 594, 598 [86 P.2d 1071] ; note 2 D.C.L.A. Law 
Rev. 269.) Moreover, any change should be made only 
after a complete examination of all of the consequences. If 
adoption is to effect a complete substitution in family relation-
ship, the legal rights of collateral relatives should be fully 
considered in connection with statutes relating to pretermitted 
heirs, inheritance taxes and the like. 
[8] Finally some significance is attached to the fact that 
Calhoun's estate consists of property to which Mrs. Oreb 
would have succeeded had George predeceased his adoptive 
mother, and to the alleged fact that he had never known his 
natural parents or natural brother. The record is silent upon 
the latter point, and the former is fully answered by the court 
in the Jobson case: "It may properly be observed •.. that 
the rights of the parties are not affected by the circumstance 
that the estat.e in dispute was derived entirely from the adopt-
ing parent. The source from which the property came may 
well influence one's notions of the natural equity of the ap-
pellant's claim. But our statute of succession, in providing 
for the disposition of the separate property of one dying 
intestate, makes no distinctions based upon the emmnel 
388 ESTATE OF CALHOUN [44 C.2d 
through which the property may have come to the decedent." 
(164 Cal. 314.) 
The order is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
The interpretation placed upon the relevant statutes by 
the majority opinion results in consequences totally at variance 
with the objective of making the relationship between adoptive 
parents and their adopted child as close to the natural rela-
tionship as possible. (See Adoption of McDonald, 43 Cal. 
2d 447, 459 [274 P.2d 860] ; In re Santos, 185 Cal. 127. 130 
[195 P. 1055]; 2 Armstrong California Family Law, 1242-
1243. ) Children who have been raised together as brothers 
and sisters are set against one another whenever intestate 
succession from another than their parent is involved, 
and rights of natural kindred whose existence or iden-
tity will frequently be unknown to the adoptive family 
are allowed to intervene between foster brothers and sisters 
who have known no others. Although the Legislature has 
made detailed provisions for the issuance of new birth certifi-
cates and the sealing of original records in cases of adoption 
to promote and protect the adoptive relationship (Health & 
Saf. Code, §§ 10251-10254), in many cases of intestate suc-
cession this policy of secrecy will have to be evaded or the 
estates of adopted children will perforce escheat to the state. 
In other cases, natural grandchildren who have been adopted 
will be permitted to claim as pretermitted heirs of natural 
grandparents who had no knowledge of their existence or 
identity. (Prob. Code, § 90.) The statutes do not expressly 
provide for these results, and in my opinion by adopting the 
Probate Code in 1931 the Legislature did not accept and ap-
prove of the interpretation placed upon the superseded pro-
visions of the Civil Code by In re Darling, 173 Cal. 221 [159 
P. 606]. 
As the majority opinion points out, by enacting section 
257 of the Probate Code,· the Legislature did not change the 
.,' An adopted child succeeds to the estate of one who has adopted him, 
the same ag a natural child; and the person adopting succeeds to the 
estate of an adoptcd ehild, the same as a natural parent. An adopted 
child does not succeed to till' estate of a natural parent when the rela-
tionship between them has lwrl1 s('\'el'cc] hy the adoption. nor does such 
natural parent succeed to the c~tate of such adopted child." 
... 
) 
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existing law governing intestate succession by or from adopted 
children (see also Estate of Hebert, 42 Cal.App.2d 664, 6-67-
668 [109 P.2d 729]), and that section only governs rights 
of inheritance between the adopted child and adoptive parents 
and the adopted child and natural parents. Thus, to deter-
mine whether an adopted child may inherit through an 
adoptive parent or whether natural relatives may inherit 
from an· adopted child through its natural parent, it is 
necessary to construe the provisions of the Probate Code 
in the light of the provisions of the Civil Code governing the 
status of an adopted child. 
Section 228 of the Civil Code provides: "A child when 
adopted, may take the family name of the person adopting. 
After adoption, the two shall sustain towards each other the 
legal relation of parent and child, and have all the rights 
and be subject to all the duties of that relation." Section 
229 provides: "The parents of an adopted child are, from 
the time of the adoption, relieved of all parental duties toward, 
and all responsibility for, the child so adopted, and have no 
right over it." In interpreting these statutes in In re Darling, 
supra, the court stated: "The adoption statutes of this state 
do not purport to affect the relationship of any person other 
than ·that of the parent,s by blood, the adopting parents, and 
the child. It is the person adopting and the child who, by 
the express terms of the section, after adoption 'shall sustain 
towards each other the legal relation of parent and child and 
have all the rights and be subject to all the duties of that 
relation,' and it is the parents by blood who, from the time 
of the adoption, are 'relieved of all parental duties towards, 
and all responsibilities for the child so adoptcd, and have no 
right over it,' and are, in the eyes of the law, no longer its 
parents. The adoption simply fixes the status of the child 
as to its former and adopted parents. To its grandparents by 
blood it continues to be a grandchild. and the child of its 
parents by blood. It does not acquire new grandparents 
in the persons of the father and mother of an adopting pa-
rent." (173 Cal. 221. 225-226.) It is immediately apparent 
that the court in the Darling case failed to give effect to the 
provision of the statute that the adopted child shall have "all 
of the rights" of "the legal relation of parent and child," 
and accordingly recognized only a restricted and imperfect 
"legal relation of parent and child. " Thus a child is entitled 
to inherit from his grandparent only because he is the child 
of the deceased child of the grandparent and thus aolely 
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because of the parent-child relationship. An adopted child is 
not given all of the rights of that relationship if he may not 
also inherit from his adoptive grandparent or through his 
adoptive parent in any case in which a natural child could 
do so. 
The conclusion that the court erred in its interpretation 
of section 228 in the Darling case finds further support in 
legislative history. The forerunner of section 228, after pro-
viding that the adoptive parent and child should "bear to-
ward each other the legal relation of parent and child," and 
that the child should "enjoy all the legal rights and [be] 
subject to all the duties appertaining to that relation," ex-
pressly stated "except, however, that if the adopted child 
leaves descendants, ascendants, brothers or sisters, the party 
adopting, nor his relatives, shall not inherit the estate of the 
adopted child .... " (Stats. 1869-1870, pp. 530-531.) Thus 
the Legislature clearly recognized that the legal relation of 
parent and child would result in the child's becoming a mem-
ber of the adoptive family for all purposes of inheritance 
and expressly provided for the exceptions thought desirable, 
and it must be presumed that it intended to change the law 
when it deleted the exception in 1872. (In re Trombley, 31 
Ca1.2d 801, 806-807 [193 P.2d 734].) 
The rationale of the Darling case has never been con-
sistently followed. In other situations involving adopted 
children it has been recognized that the adoptive relationship 
necessarily affects the status of the adopted child with respect 
to third parties. Thus, even in In re-Darling it was recog-
nized that if an adopted child is to have "all of the rights" 
of the parent-child relationship, his children must in turn be 
allowed to inherit from their adoptive grandfather (173 
Cal. 221, 225: see also Estate of Winchester, 140 Cal. 468, 
469-470 [74 P. 10]), and in Estate of Pierce, 32 Ca1.2d 265, 
270 [196 P.2d 1], it was pointed out in discussing the anti-
lapse statute (Prob. Code, § 92) that" 'The law •.. creating 
the status is found in section 228 of the Civil Code providing 
that" after adoption the two shall sustain towards each other 
the legal relation of parent and child, and have all the rights 
and be subject to all the duties of that relation." ... That 
such adopted child is to be considered an "issue" and a lineal 
descendant of the adopting parent, has been on several oc-
casions recognized by our courts ...• To exclude adopted 
children from its scope woul(l be to say that they are not en-
titled as to the adopting pal'cnt, to the full rights of natural 
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children, which is contrary to the express prOVISIOn of the 
statute.'" (Quoting from Estate of Moore, 7 Cal.App.2d 
722,724 [47 P.2d 533, 48 P.2d 28] ; see also Estate of Tibbetts, 
48 Cal.App.2d 177, 178 [119 P.2d 368] ; Estate of Esposito, 
57 Cal.App.2d 859,865 [135 P.2d 167].) Although the Pierce, 
Tibbetts, and Esposito cases recognized the rule of the Darl-
ing case, none of them explained why the provisions of sec-
tion 228 must be read into section 92 of the Probate Code but 
be ignored in considering intestate succession through an 
adoptive parent, and the statutes themselves provide no basis 
for such a distinction. If section 228 of the Civil Code re-
quires that the adopted child be allowed to take from his 
adoptive grandparent under the antilapse provisions of sec-
tion 92 of the Probate Code, it must also require tllat he be 
allowed to take by intestate succession. In either situation he 
can take only because he is a child of the adoptive parent, and 
if the adoption changes his status with respect to the adoptive 
grandparent in one situation it must do so also in the other. 
If it is true that the Legislature adopted the rule of the 
Darling case when it enacted the Probate Code in 1931, it 
might be suggested that the Moore, Tibbetts, and Esposito 
eases, decided since that time, should be disapproved. The 
Darling case did not, however, represent a settled rule in this 
state at the time it was decided (see Estate of Jobson, 164 Cal. 
812, 817 [128 P. 938, 43 L.R.A.N.S. 1062], expressly leaving 
the question open), and the cases that have followed it were 
all decided after the Probate Code was enacted. (Estate of 
Pence, 117 Cal.App. 323, 333 [4 P.2d 202] ; Estate of Jones, 
8 Cal.App.2d 895, 398 [39 P.2d 847] ; Estate of Stewart, 30 
Cal.App.2d 594, 596-597 [86 P.2d 1071]; Estate of Kruse, 
120 Cal.App.2d 254, 255-256 [260 P.2d 969].) Moreover, in 
1928, the court rejected the rationale of the Darling case in 
Estate of Mercer, 205 Cal. 506 [271 P. 1067], and held that 
an adopted child of a predeceased spouse could take under the 
predecessor of section 228 of the Probate Code on the death 
of the surviving spouse. "Appellant admits that the word 
'issue' in several places in said section does include an 
adopted child. Again, an adopted child has been held to be 
a lineal descendant of the adopting parent. [Citations.] If 
this be conceded, it argues strongly for the ruJe that an 
adopted child is entitled to any legacy the law gives to the 
children of an adopting parent." (205 Cal. 506, 511.) AI. 
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Darling case on the ground that the adopted child in the 
Mercer case did not inherit through her predeceased adoptive 
mother but indirectly from her (see Estate of Kruse, 120 Cal. 
App.2d 254, 257 [260 P.2d 969]), this distinction is not 
justified in the light of the cases that have considered the 
character of succession under section 228. That section "is as 
much a part of the law of succession as any other, and those 
who inherit under it take as heirs of the decedent widow or 
widower, not as the heirs of the predeceased spouse." (Estate 
of Watts, 179 Cal. 20, 23 [175 P. 415].) "The respondent's 
relationship to her deceased mother would be the determining 
factor in establishing her status as an heir of [her stepfather] ; 
but the title to the property she is entitled to receive by 
reason of that status would not relate back for its origin, 
to her mother. It would come directly to her from her step-
father. She would take as ... [his] heir .... " (Estate of 
Marshall, 42 Cal.App. 683, 687 [184 P. 43] ; see also Estate 
of Jobson, 164 Cal. 312, 314 [128 P. 938, 43 L.R.A.N.S. 1062].) 
Moreover, the Mercer case was not decided on the theory that 
the adopted child inherited indirectly from her predeceased 
adoptive parent but on the ground, as noted above, that she 
was "entitled to any legacy that the law gives to the children 
of an adopting parent." 
It thus appears that both before and after the enactment 
of the Probate Code the cases have been in essential conflict 
with respect to inheritance by ur from adopted children. 
Given the conflicting theories relied upon in the cases decided 
before the enactment of the Probate Code and the fact that 
the last decision before that time was clearly not in harmony 
with the relationale of the Darling case, it cannot reasonably 
be said that the Legislature adopted the rule of that case 
when it enacted the Probate Code. Accordingly, this court 
is free to resolve the conflict in the decisions in the light of 
the clearly expressed policy of section 228 of the Civil Code 
and sections 10251 to 10254 of the Health and Safety Code. 
Whatever doubt there may have been with respect to that 
policy in the past, it is clear today that the objective of 
adoption is the" consummation of the closest conceivable coun-
terpart of the relation of parent and child," in which the 
child becomes a member" to all intents and purposes, of the 
family of the foster parents." (In re Santos, supra, 185 Cal. 
127, 130; see also Adoption of McDonald, s'u,pra, 43 Ca1.2d 
447,459 (274 P.2d 860].) Only by tl'eating the adoptive child 
) 
) 
as a natural child for all purposes of inheritance 18 that 
objective obtained. 
The order should be reversed. 
Carter, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was d('nied May 25, 
1955. Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
